The Presence of United States in Middle East: Stability or Instability

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Abstract: The questions in this study, have given rise to some strong opinions. Hardliners in the Iranian government, for example, argue that all outside forces must leave the region before any new approach to security and cooperation can be advanced. Some Western analysts, on the other hand, believe that future approaches to regional security will require an intimate network of collective defense arrangement between outside powers, particularly United States, and selected regional states. Between these two extreme lie more subtle approaches. It seems clear that any regional security architecture in the Middle East will have several components. The object of this paper is to undertake a descriptive study of Middle East security and the role of United States with a view to the Iraq war, the first steps and primary goals of United States and analysis the present condition of the regional security. journal of American Science 2011; 9(6):-]. (ISSN: 1545-1003). http://www.americanscience.org.

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Introduction

The United States emerged from the Cold War with enormous power and few if any major threats. Its supremacy was unquestioned, its allies were many and relatively powerful, its rivals were few and relatively weak and major war seemed unlikely but there were few contingencies that could imaginable pose a large or serious threat to American security. Against traditional security challenges and challengers, the United States was extraordinarily secure.

Accordingly, as the Cold War ended, Washington almost immediately became preoccupied with unconventional and asymmetric challenges to its security, its global position and its regional interests. Particularly worrisome was the possibility that weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and especially nuclear weapons, might spread into the hands of hostile powers and pose grave risks for the United States at home and to its overseas interests. Among US objectives, President George H.W. Bush's 1991 National Security Strategy document urged, none is more urgent than stopping the global proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons as well as missiles to deliver them.

The Clinton administration deviated not at all from this judgment. If anything, it raised the issue still higher on the agenda, enshrining nuclear proliferation as the number-one threat to American security. Few things could upset US security in any big way, but one of them was nuclear weapons in the hands of so-called rogue states, with their outlaw ways, their hostile designs, their revisionist aspirations and their destabilizing regional behaviors. Throughout the Clinton years, his administration focused heavily on rogue states, seeking to deny them WMD capabilities, to contain their destabilizing effects, and to deter their expansionist tendencies. [1]

Simultaneous with the surge of proliferation to the top of the defense Policy agenda was the emergence of a transnational terrorism threat aimed at American targets and American interests. This assault may have begun during the G.H.W. Bush administration, but was dramatically thrust into prominence early in the Clinton administration by the first. By the end of the decade, those in the Clinton administration responsible for counterterrorism believed themselves to be at war with the primary terrorist adversary, al - Qaeda. The Clinton administration took this threat seriously, gave it high priority and sought to marshal military, police and intelligence resources to combat it. Though generally overshadowed and handicapped by the president's own political and personal troubles, the campaign against al-Qaeda was an urgent item on the administration's agenda by the end of Clinton's second term and during the presidential transition in 2001 he urged the new Georg W. Bush administration to make this campaign, one of their highest priorities. [2]

Bush's democratization agenda, in short, adds an enormously challenging dimension to the regime change concept. These are the ideas that led the United States into Iraq and determined its broad course once there. What are the lessons to be derived from Iraq now that these ideas have been tested? How much is the present situation of Iraq security, near to

above roadmap and also how this roadmap can be generalized to the Middle East as a whole?

1. US Strategy from 11 September to Baghdad
1-1. The Bush Administration's Road Map

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 cast these long-familiar issues in a different light. The threat seemed larger and more immediate. The need for effective remedies seemed more urgent. In response to this challenge, the Bush administration adopted an aggressive strategy designed to attack and eliminate a set of threats now understood to be large and urgent. Regime change was the best and only reliable answer to the rogue state threat. The crux of the problem from the American point of view is hostile regimes that truck with terrorists and seek WMD. To this ideas President Bush has added that, the policy of regime change will be linked to a program of democratization- the Freedom Agenda – intended to liberalize the target states and to bring to power congenial regimes throughout the greater Middle East. This initiative has gained in prominence as the other rationales for war in Iraq faded, and it has become the central theme of President Bush's foreign policy. It is based on a set of debatable propositions about the relationship between democracy and terror and about the likely consequences of democratization. But nevertheless the president is fervently committed to this agenda and clearly believes that bringing democracy to previously undemocratic lands will advantage the United States, undermine the terrorists, inoculate against rogue leaders, and help bring peace to region. The targets of regime change will be societies that are deeply undemocratic, that lack the institutions of civil and political life that make democracy work, that have little experience or tradition of democratic governance, and that will often have a deeply entrenched tradition of violent and corrupt politics.

The impetus for offensive action also has a temporal dimension. To wait was to allow the hostile powers to grow stronger to move closer to obtaining WMD capability. Going on the offensive 11 September meant, of course, a campaign against al-Qaeda and its terrorist affiliates. [3]

President Bush has added the policy of regime change will be linked to a program of democratization- the Freedom Agenda – intended to liberalize the target states and to bring to power congenial regimes throughout the greater Middle East. This initiative has gained in prominence as the other rationales for war in Iraq faded, and it has become the central theme of President Bush's foreign policy. It is based on a set of debatable propositions about the relationship between democracy and terror and about the likely consequences of democratization. But

nevertheless the president is fervently committed to this agenda and clearly believes that bringing democracy to previously undemocratic lands will advantage the United States, undermine the terrorists, inoculate against rogue leaders, and help bring peace to region. In the context of the other elements of the Bush strategy, however, the main implication of the Freedom Agenda is that every regime change becomes a grand experiment in social engineering. Almost by definition, the targets of regime change will be societies that are deeply undemocratic, that lack the institutions of civil and political life that make democracy work, that have little experience or tradition of democratic governance, and that will often have a deeply entrenched tradition of violent and corrupt politics. Bush's democratization agenda, in short, adds an enormously challenging dimension to the regime change concept.

The Bush administration attacked Iraq with both destructive and constructive objectives in mind. On the destructive side of the equation, Bush sought to remove Saddam from power, destroy his regime, and eliminate Iraq from the roster of serious proliferation worries. On the constructive side, Bush sought to implement his policy of democracy promotion, to help create a stable, secular and democratic state. Building the new Iraq has proven to be painful, costly and difficult, and it remains to be seen whether Bush will succeed in achieving his constructive goals.

The destructive agenda, however, was successful and was accomplished quickly and relatively cheaply. When President Bush has his famous 'mission accomplished' moment on 1 May 2003, it was undoubtedly the fulfillment of his destructive aims that he and his team were celebrating. As for as the Bush administration was concerned, Saddam Hussein's Iraq was number one on the list of hostile, aggressive, proliferation-hungry, terrorism-sponsoring states. It was imperative, in their view, to remove this dangerous threat before it caused or contributed to some further horrible damage to the United States. The willful and impressive application of American military power had erased that threat, utterly and completely. In the Bush administration's reckoning, this was a major gain for American security and a major blow to the insidious coalition of evil states and radical Islamist terrorists.

In president Bush's eyes, the most essential part of the mission in Iraq was successful and what this implies is that, the two halves of the strategy – destroying intolerable enemies on the one hand, and promoting freedom and democracy on the other – are not inherently linked (however preferable it is to link them, both from a moral and perhaps also from a domestic political point of view). These are separable objectives and however inadequate US power has

been in democracy promotion it was show to be quite effective at enemy destruction. In both Iraq and Afghanistan the offending regimes were quickly swept from the board. Faced with potential threats that are perceived by the Bush administration and many others in the American political scene as intolerable, unacceptable and evil, removing such players from the board will be viewed as a highly desirable and potentially tempting option. [4]

1-2. Winding Down the War in Iraq

By September 2008, when General David Petraeus as the top commander of the Multi-National force in Iraq, there was the prevalent sense among Americans that the surge of additional U.S. forces into the country in 2007 had succeeded. Violence greatly should be reduced and the war seemed to be over. In July 2008 Bush had announced that violence in Iraq had decreased (to its lowest level since the spring of 2004) and a significant reason for this, sustain progress was "The success of the surge".

The surge capitalized on intra-Shiite and intra-Sunni struggles to help decrease violence, which created the context for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. With U.S. troops on pace to depart entirely by December 2011, Iraqis held successful national election and eventually formed a broadly inclusive government. In this regard, Bush administration was focused more heavily on leaving Iraq than on supporting the country's attempt to built a democratic system of government. [5]

Bush, himself shows no sign of wavering from the constructive side of his ambitious agenda. Democracy promotion continues to figure centrally in his public utterances – and indeed was a prominent them of his second inaugural address. But implicit in the administration's defense of its Iraq policy is an alternative strategy that is narrower and less ambitious. After Iraq, there may be a temptation to skip the social engineering and focus on destroying enemies. Indeed, those skeptical of the prospects for democracy in the Arab and Islamic world argued even before the intervention in Iraq that United States should focus on threat reduction rather than democracy promotion.

In such a conception, the United States would not be indifferent to the consequences of regime change in a target state, but the core objective would be a stable, cooperative, unthreatening regime. If democratic, so much the better, but the goal would be to eliminate a threat without re-running the Iraq experience. A further variant of this approach would suggest that even coping with a period of uncertainty and instability is better than living with an intolerable threat. Iraq may be a mess, but its government is not menacing neighbors or pursuing nuclear weapons, and

hence the current situation is better for American and regional security than the previous reality.

In effect, this is a strategy that envisions employing US power as a wrecking ball to destroy dangerous and unacceptable but deeply entrenched status quos. It seems, Stability in the Middle East was not United States goal, it was their target. They wanted radical change in the Middle East. They were determined to drain the swamp – that is, to alter the political climate of the region so that it would no longer be so hospitable to the terrorists inhabiting it. A less charitable way of putting it was that they were willing to take a chance and then groove on the rubble. [6]

When confronted by the intolerable, the unacceptable, the evil, the crucial first step is to eliminate the offending party, to disrupt the threatening status quo. Whatever comes next is almost by definition preferable to and more hopeful than the unbearable reality that preventive war in the first place. Such a strategic rational may be at least implicit in the continuing calls in some quarters for preventive action in pursuit of regime change in Syria and Iran, despite the experience in Iraq.

This is a line of thought that seeks to retain the option of using force for regime change while limiting Washington's risks and liabilities and forsaking ambitious political renovations. The logic of this strategy is sound but there is reason to question whether it will really be dramatically more effective than Bush's Iraq policy. For one thing, upending a stable status quo and creating uncontrolled instability could produce an outcome that is worse rather than better – bringing to power radical Islamists, for example. There is also a real risk that the American wrecking ball will produce not hopeful or promising situations but failed states that may exacerbate the terrorism problem and intensify rather than soothe regional difficulties. Washington will not solve the type of threat posed by per -11 September Afghanistan by creating post- 11 September failed states. Furthermore, it is by no means clear that the troubles in Iraq have been caused primarily by Bush's hopes for democratization. Iraq has been marked by the breakdown of public order, the bitterness and resistance of deposed elites, unrestrained factional competition for power in conditions of political vacuum, ferocious sectarian rivalry, meddlesome and enflaming intrusions by self-interested neighboring states, and the pernicious persistence of extreme violence that political and social life of the country. These harsh realities appear to by – products of the US invasion and the destruction of Saddam's regime. None appears clearly attributable to the goal of democratization. Thus, while there is no question that the United States has ability to destroy hostile regimes

when it chooses o do so, it may in fact not be possible to avoid the adverse or destabilizing consequences of such action. If Iraq is the harbinger of things to come, forcible regime change is never going to be an easy option. The Iraqis must still develop the necessary institutions to manage competition for power and resources peacefully. [7]

By the end of Bush presidency, Obama administration was focused on leaving Iraq and supporting the country's attempt to build a democratic system of government in this regard, Washington could live with an Iran that abandoned its nuclear ambitions and respected its neighbors' sovereignty.

1-2. Appraising Obama's Foreign Policy

The first set of foreign-policy and national-security issues facing President Barack Obama 'on day on', 20 January 2009, will no doubt focus on the Greater Middle East. The United States is fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and candidate Obama enunciated a clear perspective on each of them. He will also need, soon after inauguration, to decide what to do about Iran, where the United States, its allies and partners have deep concerns and where the 'clock is ticking' in regard to its nuclear program. These three issues will be on the new President's immediate agenda, along with a thematic issue, Islamist terrorism, involved with all of them. [8]

Zbigniew Brzezinski, (the U.S National Security Advisor) in his recent book" Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Super Power", states that, the Foreign Policy of U.S. President Barack Obama can be assessed most usefully in two parts: his goals and decision–making system and, second, his policies and their implementation. Although one can speak with some confidence the former, the latter is still an unfolding process.

To his credit, Obama has undertaken a truly ambitious effort to redefine the United States 'view of the world and to reconnect the United States with the emerging historical context of the twenty –first century. He has done this remarkably well. In less than a year, he has comprehensively conceptualized U.S. foreign policy with respect to several centrally important geopolitical issues:

• Islam is not an enemy, and the "global war on terror" does not define the United States' current role in the world;

• The United States will be a fair –minded and assertive mediator when it comes to attaining lasting peace between Israel and Palestine;

• The United States ought to pursue serious negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program, as well as other issues;

• The counterinsurgency campaign in the Taliban-controlled parts of Afghanistan should be part of a larger political undertaking, rather than a predominantly military one;

• The United States should respect Latin American's cultural and historical sensitivities and expand its contacts with Cuba;

•The United States ought to energize its commitment to significantly reducing nuclear arsenal and embrace the eventual goal of a world free of nuclear weapons;

• In coping with global problems, China should be treated not only as an economic partner but also geopolitical one;

• Improving U.S. –Russian relation is in the obvious interest of both sides, although this must be done in a manner that accepts, rather than seeks to undo, post War geopolitical realities;

• And a truly collegial transatlantic partnership should be given deeper meaning, particularly in order to heal the rifts caused by the destructive controversies of the past few years.

For all that, he did deserve the Nobel Peace Prize. Overall, Obama has demonstration a genuine sense of strategic direction, a solid grasp of what today's world is all about, and an understanding of what the United States ought to be doing in it. [9]

For Establishment of a permanent regional mechanism for the exchange of information on issues of concern to regional security in the Middle East and to strengthen the stability and democratic aspirations, nuclear Tehran would be a serious obstacle.

The threat posed by an Iran with nuclear weapons would be limited to the possibility that it would actually use those weapons.

Iran would use its nuclear umbrella to protect itself and its clients in Iraq and this is the most dangerous threat for the Middle East security making process and United States must consider all these issues carefully.

Barack Obama in one of his last speeches of December 2011, hit back at criticism by Republican presidential candidates of his handling of Iran and its crucial role in Middle East security.

Obama said his frank and open relationship with China had "yielded considerable benefits" including a united front against Iran's nuclear ambitions.

Asked to respond to Republican candidate Mitt Romney's assertion that Iran would succeed in developing a nuclear weapon if Obama were to be re-elected, the president cited "steady, determined, firm progress in isolating the Iranian regime."

Obama said sanctions he has pushed have had "enormous bite" on Iran's economy and influence, and he stressed that while he preferred a diplomatic resolution to the dispute, no option was off the table.

"Is this an easy issue? No. Anybody who claims it is either politicking or doesn't know what they're talking about," Obama said.

Romney is the current front-runner for the Republican presidential nomination to face Obama in the November 2012 election, when Obama is seeking a second term in office. [10]

2. New Iraq: Success and Challenges

Iraq, as a major country in the Middle East region, traditionally played an important role with regard to stability and security in the area. However, the Ba'athist Iraq, under Saddam Hossein, acted in large measure as a source of instability, tension and conflict in the area. That period came to an end in 2003 with the collapse of the Saddam Hossein's regime and the emergence of the government system in the country. Considering Iraq's position in the region as well as its quite substantial potentials, this country can still play such an important role, perhaps more important than in the past, in the stability and security of the region. Characteristics of the "New Iraq", particularly, its unfolding democratic experience and governance and a new collaborative approach to foreign policy, especially towards the neighboring countries, have raised hopes for Iraq's perspective positive contribution to regional stability, security, convergence, and ultimate integration, based on a new pattern of engagement and collaboration among regional states and actors. The last fair election in Iraq is a sign that was well for the continued growth of democratic attitudes and institutions in this country. [11]

Although elections on their own are not a sufficient condition of democracy, they are certainly a necessary element in post authoritarian democratic transitions. It was thus hardly surprising that the approach of Iraq's 7 March 2010 general elections generated a healthy dose of curiosity and anticipation among analysts of Iraq as well as students of democratization in general. This election, at its most basic level, was free and fair and the fragility of this election is undeniable, especially if the increasingly discriminating Iraqi voters are thwarted by the self interested machinations of politicians. Yet prospect are still reasonably hopeful, The elections were able to go forward in atmosphere remarkably free of violence, political conflicts were peacefully resolved within the rules of the democratic game, both the electoral process and its results met with general acceptance, and the results could not be predicted at any stage of the process. All signs were well for the continued growth of democratic attitudes and institutions in Iraq.

Despite the successful transition from the surge to sovereignty in Iraq, it is clear that lots of challenges remain on the horizon for internal Iraqi politics and the U.S. Iraqi relationship. The fraught formation of a governing coalition following Iraq's March 2010 national elections revealed how fragile the country's political institutions remain. Although Iraq's 2009 provincial elections had brought the Sunnis into local government and promoted reconciliation, the 2010 contest saw friction once again. Maleki accused former elements of Saddam Hussein's Baath Party, along with Syria, of masterminding continued attacks in Iraq. Some Shiite politicians, supported by Iran, sought to weaken the nationalist, nonsectarian Iraqiya Party, led by Ayad Allowi, by attempting to disqualify its candidates as former Baath Party members.

The Iraqiya Party overcame these challenges and narrowly won the election, with 91 seats, gaining the votes of most Sunnis and of a sizable proportion of secular Shiites. Maliki's Dawa Party came in a close second, with 89 seats, and the two factions left Iraq in political limbo, with each side seeking to secure a majority in parliament in order to a coalition government. Ironically, both the United States and Iran supported Maliki's bid to remain prime minister; U.S. leaders sought to broker a power –sharing arrangement between the two parties to keep Sadr's followers out of the government and strengthen reconciliation, whereas Iran hoped for a Shiite-dominated coalition. Maliki and Allowi grudgingly came to terms this past December, with Maliki retaining his post as prime minister and Allawi becoming head of the newly created National Council for Higher Policies, the purview of which remains uncertain. [12]

Although a government has been formed, Iraq's political factions sadly missed an opportunity to sector the public's belief in the democratic system. Instead of demonstrating a peaceful transition of power and unity, the process revealed the lingering mistrust within Iraqi society, particularly among the ruling elites, who appeared ready to elevate their personal interests above the national good. Meanwhile, Iraqis remain skeptical of the large and unwieldy coalition assembled by Maliki, which enjoys few points of agreement and will have difficulty grappling with politically sensitive issues, such as federalism, the sharing of oil revenues, and the demarcation of internal borders. True reconciliation among Iraq's and religious groups thus remains elusive, and what progress has been achieved so far could unravel.

Meanwhile, the Obama administration's rhetorical emphasis on the troop withdrawal-meant for a domestic audience-has largely over-shadowed the quiet burgeoning strategic partnership between Iraq and the United States. Washington needs to devote adequate attention and resources to furthering the Strategic Framework Agreement, which established the basis for possible long-term cooperation between

the two countries. Iraqi politicians from all communities, save the Sadrists, have voiced concern that the United States is too focused on withdrawing from Iraq, placing stability before democracy and strengthening Maliki's ability to maintain control of the country through the ISF rather than through the consent of Iraq's politicians or public. They have also expressed concern about Iraq's ambitions and aspirations in Iraq-an issue that will loom over the country for years to come.

Some political experts believe that Iraq still has a long way to go before it becomes a stable, sovereign, and self-reliant country. Continued engagement by the United States can help bring Iraq closer to the American vision of a nation that is at peace with itself, a participant in the global marker of goods and ideas, and an ally against violent extremists. Under the terms of the Strategic Framework Agreement, the United States should continue to encourage reconciliation, help build professional civil service and non-sectarian institutions, promote the establishment of checks and balances between the country's parliament and executive branch, and support the reintegration of displaced persons and refugees. U.S. assistance is also needed to bolster Iraq's civilian control over its security forces invest in the country's police units, and remove the Iraqi army from the business of policing. Should Washington fail to provide such support, there is a risk that Iraq's different groups may revert to violence to achieve their goals and that the Iraqi government may become increasingly, authoritarian rather that democratic- undermining the United States enormous investment of blood and treasure. [13]

During the highly symbolic ceremony on 19 December 2011 which according to a US army tradition is called "casing," the US military took down its flags and put them in a case to send them back home.

. The Iraqi lawmakers said that the US was forced to leave Iraq and now the US troops will be basing in the neighboring countries to observe the country's situation to intervene which is something the government strongly oppose.

The secretary general of Al Ahrar Bloc in Iraq stated that the Iraqis believe that the US troops brought destruction to their country and violence.

Political experts stated that the next few days will witness the withdrawal of the last US soldier from the last two US bases in the country according to a tactical withdrawal.

The withdrawal comes after nearly nine years US occupation of Iraq that has left some 4500 Americans dead and cost Washington more than USD 800 billion.

More than one million Iraqis have been killed in the US-led invasion and subsequent occupation of the country since 2003, according to the California-based investigative organization Project Censored.

Washington claimed the military action was carried out to find and destroy weapons of mass destruction in the country while former dictator Saddam Hussein's Baathist regime was still in power. However, no WMDs were ever discovered in Iraq. [14]

Iraq will be tested in the days ahead by terrorism and by those who would seek to divide by economic and social issues, by the demands of democracy itself."

As General Martin Dempsey, whose career has been tied to Iraq for 20 years dating back to the 1991 Gulf War, commanding 30,000 troops in Baghdad in 2003, and returning to lead the training of Iraqi security forces has been asked to explain on 19 December, The final 3,500 U.S. troops will depart Iraq quickly in the coming days. Many of the remaining headquarters staff planned to leave the country on Thursday immediately after the ceremony. The last U.S. troop convoy to roll across the border is expected in Kuwait by the end of December. [15]

It seems the stability and security situation in Iraq after U.S. forces withdrawal, depend on its neighbored countries situations, especially Iran that its regional role and its bargaining power in the regions affairs has become a connection between Middle East security and international security.

3. Iran and the Middle East Security

In the years since the September 11 attacks and the onset of crisis in Iraq, Iran's consolidation of its political-security role in the Middle East, and its impact upon regional and international security systems has been increased, for two reason, first, in the term of the nature of issues and geography, with the new geopolitical developments that emanated from the 2003 Iraq crisis, Iran has become the main hub of political-security affairs in the region. Second, with the rise to power of the Shiite factor in Iraq and the region, Iran became capable of powerfully affecting the region's political dynamics. In other words, Iran's role is becoming more significant in the areas and issues which have turned into key concerns of the international community. [16]

In such an environment, merely issuing warning to Iran, selling more weapons to Persian Gulf Arab governments, and declaring that the United States will protect other states in the region will not be sufficiently convincing to maintain peace and stability. Will Iran believe that Obama would go to war, especially nuclear war, to constrain it? Will Arab rulers bet their regimes and their personal survival on this expectation? To these questions, the likely answer is no.

Iran is expected to act rationally and to respond to pressure with moderation. This could be accurate, but it certainly cannot be assumed. Tehran may not be suicidal, but it is prone to risk taking, and as a highly ideological regime that is likely to miscalculate in ways that could lead to war. It might underestimate the chance that it will suffer a nuclear attack if it uses nuclear weapons, or it might think that it can go to the brink without setting off a conflict or that it can fool its enemies by secretly transferring arms to others.

In U.S. political leaders statements, Washington has responded passively to Iran's cooperation with al Qaeda and to its transfer of conventional weapons to Hamas, Hezbollah, anti-American Islamist groups in Afghanistan, and radical Shiite militias in Iraq. It is very likely that a nuclear Tehran would escalate its transfer of other arms to its clients.

The threat posed by an Iran with nuclear weapons would be limited to the possibility that it would actually use those weapons.

Iran would use its nuclear umbrella to protect itself and its clients in Iraq. As Abdul Rahman al-Rashed, the general manager of the al Arabiya television network, has written, "An Iranian bomb, will not be put to military use, it will be used as a way to change the rules of the game." Iran would not need to attack anyone; it would merely need to ensure that no one else threatened or pressured it as it stepped its efforts to subvert neighboring governments.

It is for more likely that the revisionist game will field fruit and that the bomb will make Iran more powerful, respected, and influential. This is especially so since the containment policy being proposed in the U.S. policy debate would cost Iran almost nothing compared to the gains it could be enjoying. [17]

Washington could live with an Iran that abandoned its nuclear ambitions and respected its neighbors' sovereignty.

The U.S plan is to contain Iran by persuading Iran's rulers that the U.S. government is so strong and daring that it will smash them if they cross its "redlines" and by reassuring Arab regimes threatened by Iran that they are secure under the United States' nuclear umbrella. But the current U.S. government cannot project such an image of itself when it has decried the United States' past use of force and generally rejected the idea of strong U.S. leadership in the world. Without the requisite credibility and genuine toughness, a containment strategy is extremely dangerous. If a nuclear Iran acted aggressively, either the United States would fail deter it which would bring a strategic disaster or it would surprise an understandably skeptical Tehran by retaliating in response to a move that Iran thought it could get away with which would mean war.

Successfully containing Iran would be extraordinarily difficult and would require major changes in the U.S. government's thinking and behavior. It would first require understanding the inescapable conflict between U.S. interests and revolutionary Islamist movements and recognizing that a regional alliance led by Iran would be an extremely dangerous adversary, one more determined and more ruthless than the United States itself. To contain a nuclear Iran, the United States would have to do more than apply merely one element of its Cold war experience, nuclear deterrence. Instead, it would need to adopt a truly tough, energetic, and comprehensive posture; contest every country allied with Tehran and battle every revolutionary surrogate of Tehran; and employ a gamut of overt and covert military, diplomatic, and economic tools. Given the U.S. government's failure to contemplate such measure so far, it is all the more essential to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. And if Iran does obtain nuclear weapons, the United States is going to have to invoke a containment policy far costlier and bolder than what is now being considered. [18]

4. What kind of security?

Given that any regional system that might be created in the Middle East is likely, for the foreseeable future, to be primarily state- centric, the types of security which are most relevant to this debate are 'collective defense' and 'cooperative security' – a term used here not in the sense associated with Woodrow and the league of Nations, but rather in the sense of states cooperating to establish norms of behavior and mechanisms to give those norms effect over time? Whether any future regional system is ultimately designed to provide either type of security will depend on the underlying threat perceptions of the Middle Eastern countries that take part. [19]

Moreover, the experience of other regions has shown that institutions providing different forms of security can co-exist within a given space, provided their objectives are not mutually contradictory, raising the possibility that both collective and cooperative mechanisms will emerge simultaneously in the Middle East.

If we imagine that the type of regional architecture sought for the Middle East is a collective defense arrangement, this would mean, in practice, an alliance of some sort (even if it is not called that), in which only a certain number of regional countries would band together, probably with the United States, in an attempt to resist a perceived aggressor. This would require a high degree of congruence with respect to the basic consideration of what the threat was, even if regional politics and cultural norms meant that it was never formally identified.

Historically, there has been at least one attempt to create a multilateral organization of this type in the Middle East, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), sometime know as the Baghdad Pact. This Cold War alliance against Soviet penetration of the region existed form 1955 to 1979, but was never particularly robust. The Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), created in 1981, has some elements of a defense alliance and may develop further along those lines. Though the latter dose not identify a specific enemy, both CENTO and GCC arrangements contain the idea of collective defense against aggression, though this is expressed far more weakly than it is say, the NATO Treaty.

In place of multilateral defense treaties, many Middle Eastern states traditionally relied on bilateral defense arrangement with outside power. The United Kingdom was once the primary defense partner for many regions, until it was replaced by the United States. Often these arrangements are not codified by formal treaties, but by a web of basing agreement mutual exercise arrangements and other expressions of intent. The threat which these bilateral defense arrangements are consider is not formally mentioned, but is quite clear. For the individual states, for example, it was originally Iraq, Syria and Iran, and is now Iran. [20]

In the case of such a cooperative security system, the bulk of discussions, at least initially, would likely focus on fairly traditional, state to state security. But consideration might also be given to pose mechanisms for the discussion of social, economic and political issues in region, particularly as they affect regional stability and security. It seems reasonable to expect that any such discussions would be relatively low-interest in the first instance, as many regional states are not comfortable with the idea of multilateral dialogue on such issues and without question, the creation of a regional security system in the Middle East will be a complex affaire. [21]

To the Americans, Iran has clearly been seeking to shape events in Iraq and to be the dominant external influence there; it has supported Hizbullah in Lebanon and, to a lesser extent, Hamas in the Palestinian territories; and it has been pressing forward with its nuclear development programs though all the while representing these as intended for peaceful production of electric power, not as precursor to building nuclear weapons.

For its part, Washington has continued to see Iran as a negative element in the security of the Middle East, a thorn in the US side in Iraq, an enemy of Israel, and the country most likely to profit from any mishandling of US or more Western policy in the region. The United States is committed to preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, and recent debate in American, including in the presidential election campaign, has focused on what kind of diplomacy should be pursued to see whether nonmilitary options can be effective.

Farther west, the United States has been pursuing its now-classic role of trying to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict and, especially, the struggle between Israel and the Palestinians; this time including the so-called Quartet, consisting of the United States, European Union and Russia, and efforts to implement a document a called the 'Roadmap'. This has been supplemented by a peace process re-launched at the November 2007 conference in Annapolis, Maryland. All these efforts take as their leitmotif the 'Clinton parameters' of January 2001 for a two-state solution. Recent US diplomacy has had a basis and motivation that is not just the 'business as usual' of the previous two decades. US diplomacy became discretionary and the 'bicycle' of peacemaking moved slowly forward. With the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, however, Washington had to rethink the strategic importance of Arab-Israeli peacemaking. Not only did it need European support for its Middle East policies - countering terrorism and, later, its invasion of Iraq but it also needed the support of Arab governments in countering terrorism. Taking these issues together – Afghanistan and Pakistan, Syria, Iraq, Iran and the Israeli – Palestinian conflict – Obama will have his hands full. But he can be helped by an overarching strategy that can encompass all these issues, and by the fostering of a new security structure. [22]

Conclusion

Newly introduced factors such as Al Qaeda terrorism, the regional crises in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and Lebanon, along with of the rise to power of the Shiite factor in the region's power structure and politics, have connected the Middle East security to the international security system, Political – security developments since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, as well as the Iraqi crisis have generalized, interconnected and internationalized Middle Eastern issues. In these circumstances, Iran's geopolitical characteristics, which provide it with simultaneous access to the existing political – security issues of Middle East's region, has put Iran in a position where it connects the Middle East's security system to global security system.

The present article attempt to look into the occupation of Iraq by U.S. military forces, the collapse of Saddam Hossein's regime and the process to achieve improved security, successful election, institution-building, the rule of law, economy and social development and creation of ″ New Iraq″ by the interaction and collaboration of neighboring state,

towards the development of a collective regional system.

In author point of view, From December 2011, the withdrawal time of the U.S. forces from Iraq, this country will be tested by terrorism and by those who would seek to divide by economic and social issues, by the demands of democracy itself. U.S. assistance is also needed to bolster Iraq's civilian control over its security forces invest in the country's police units, and remove the Iraqi army from the business of policing. There is a risk that Iraq's different groups may revert to violence to achieve their goals and that the Iraqi government may become increasingly, authoritarian rather than democratic. Without continued U.S. support, there is a real danger that Iraq may not succeed in using the opening provided by the surge to strengthen its stability and achieve its democratic aspirations that will have a complex and crucial interaction with the Middle East region security and international security. It is clear that the stability and security situation in Iraq after U.S. forces withdrawal depends on its neighbored countries situations, especially Iran that its regional role and its bargaining power in the regions affairs has become a connection between Middle East security and international security too.

The Iranian government believes that all outside forces, in the top of them, United States must leave the region before any new approach to security and cooperation can be advanced. because the Islamic regime in Iran reassure the other Middle East government's leaders that the U.S. unilateralism just follows its own national interest by interfere and invasion in this region for obtaining more energy resources and empower its alliances and Israel military forces as its own represent in this region for U.S. authoritarian goals.

On the other hand, some Western analysts, believe that future approaches to regional security in Middle East will require an intimate network of collective defense arrangement between outside powers, particularly United States, and selected regional states which can protect this collective defense system from acquisition of nuclear weapons and other threat which will restrict the security-building process by some states like Syria and Iran.

In U.S. political leader's statements, Washington has responded passively to Iran's cooperation with al Qaeda and to its transfer of conventional weapons to Hamas, Hezbollah, anti-American Islamist groups in Afghanistan, and radical Shiite militias in Iraq. It is very likely that a nuclear Tehran would escalate its transfer of other arms to its clients. The threat posed by an Iran with nuclear weapons would be limited to the possibility that it would actually use those weapons. Iran is expected to act rationally, a highly ideological regime that is likely to miscalculate in ways that could lead to war. It is clear that the U.S. forces withdrawal from Iraq does not mean the U.S. forces withdrawal from Middle East, so, Iran with an unprecedented opportunity to benefit from its advantageous geopolitical and cultural positions, must empower its regional and consequently, international position by trying to integrate with its neighbors and establish of a permanent regional mechanism for the exchange of information on issues of concern to regional security, such as terrorism and also trying to Devising a collective regional mechanism for confidence- building approaches, Policies and measures in the region with regard to the wide range of issues such as territorial disputes of the Presence of foreign force in the region.

In this regard and by the special diplomatic way, Iran can help establish the elemental structure for an organized, institutional collective effort towards building a new regional security system arrangement.

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